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NUMBERS DON'T LIE, BUT WE DO: REFRAMING FINANCIAL RATIONALITY THROUGH BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS

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ABSTRACT

Traditional finance is based on the assumption that individuals are perfect decision-makers who always maximize their utility and are fully informed. The reality is that most of the time, human investors are subject to their own psychological weaknesses, and life does not always conform to these assumptions. To gain a better understanding of the human element in financial decision-making, we want to investigate the concept of financial rationality in the behavioural economics space - explicitly, emotional reasoning and bounded rationality. Utilizing behavioural economic theories and research into notions of irrationality, weaknesses of will, and deviations from classical rationality, we will take a conceptual and analytical perspective. We consider key ideas such as fear, greed, regret, and overconfidence, which demonstrate how they change behaviour under risk and uncertainty. The analysis shows that bounded rationality can produce "satisficing" decisions rather than optimizing decisions and that emotional reasoning produces systematic biases related to loss aversion, mental accounting and herd behaviour. These decisions, in combination, challenge the predictive ability of traditional utility theory. The paper presents a model for behavioural adaptation in financial systems with a specific focus on awareness of emotional intelligence incorporated into financial education, policy and planning. It also calls for flexible policy tools and financial education structures that better reflect the human cognitive and emotional experience in relation to economics.

KEYWORDS: Financial Rationality, Behavioural Economics, Cognitive Bias, Investor Psychology, Affective Finance.

INTRODUCTION

In finance, numbers could be regarded as objective indicators of truth; they are precise, impartial, and verifiable. Finance is traditionally assumed to be based on economic theory. Economic theory operates under the premise of *homo economicus*, or perfect rationality, where an individual is perfectly rational, able to process all available information, and capable of making decisions that maximize utility. For this reason, the results of any financial exercise are not subjective but rather the culmination of some logical analysis that eliminates any psychological composition or fallacy.

Decades of work within behavioural economics has refuted the notion of absolute rationality, proving that human cognitive limitations alongside emotional or environmental biases reflect in many financial decisions. Decisions in the financial arena that oppose orthodox economics tend to be guided by cognitive limits, time restrictions and poor information.

Bounded rationality and emotional reasoning are two strategies behavioural economics has put together to track the paths and consequences of how human limitation and thus decision making leaves a trail from rationality. Herbert Simon said humans "satisfice" rather than maximize and in doing so, frequently rationalise through heuristics and information that is too limited, an extension to this process is emotional reasoning with views that affective states of fear, greed, remorse and overconfidence determine behaviour. Analytical reasoning bends to emotional aspects that denote herd mentality, loss aversion and framing effects.

This paper intends to fill that gap and define financial rationality not as an either-or approach as previous work in the subject allows but that psychology and emotional perspective must be applied to that process. Just because work done in that domain previously lays out that rational reasoning does not guarantee the full parameters of human emotion and cognitive limits exist at any one time in concert. The results turn out to be somewhat mixed products of human conduct and the logic of numbers. It is that mixing that is the crux of the continuum this study presents, and will certainly be aided by numerous elegant leads in the two laps of the human brain.

Financial literacy, macroeconomic performance, investment behaviour, along with policy issues for financial conduct and for behaviour are subsequently delineated using that continuum of idea.

Conceptual Framework

Behavioural economics is the theoretical basis underlying this research, allowing grander justifications for why behaviour in a financial context has deviated from normative models of rational expectations. The essential theory of finance is based on the premise that people are rational maximisers basing their judgements solely on objective logic, and pertinent numbers. Behavioural economics is an attempt at a more constructive perspective on the financial activity as an intimate environment of human emotion and cognition.


We are humans dealing with bounded rationalities because of our limited time, limited information and our own cognitive limitations; our "constrained rationality" in terms of Herbert Simon. Instead of maximizing, faced with choices we satisfice the choices we make that are "good enough" for the cognitive constraints we are facing at that time. Given limited amounts of information and psychology applied to this information, we may make reasonable financial judgements even if we do not make them most efficiently or best. The concept of emotional reasoning is closely allied to constrained rationality; the qualities of emotional affects substantially modify our judgements. In financial market events they may instil fear or greed, regret and overconfidence. These emotional qualities may take precedence over logical delineations as risk and timeframes in the marketplace shift. They may lead to systematic biases producing inefficient phenomena such as mental accounting, loss aversion, and framing which they can and do lead toward finance sub-optimisation.

Concepts of emotional reasoning and bounded rationality shed light on recommended and obvious observable behaviours where conventional sweethearts such as discounted cash flow analysis and expected utility theory fail to explain well. Behavioural phenomena apparent in the herding and overreaction to good market events, capitalised or rallying irrational exuberance wholesale as well as retail in bull and bear. Finally; concepts of constrained, and emotional thinking, lead us to a paradigm our cognitive-affective loop in an implied relationship wherein we use emotional affect and other cognitive constraints to produce financial stimulus. The subject characteristics (financial literacy, personality etc.), environmental (market volatility; behavioural societal norms etc., institutional rules, policy nudges; etc.) further modify the cognitive-affective reasoning loop.

This model "a paradigm" functions as a true-world conceptual vista for understanding financial activity heartily situating financial reasoning, within

far broader behavioural ambit. The pertinent implications are of the absolutely necessary and highly accessible realm; emotionally intelligent financial education, responsive policy finance tools,

consequential interventions all taking into consideration, people's real thoughts and feelings about money when rather than what finance research thinks people ought to do.



REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Financial Rationality

As per traditional finance theory, people behave rationally, have access to perfect knowledge, and select whatever option would increase their utility (Fama, 1970). While that is all well and good in theory, actual studies have shown that we cannot always assume rational behaviour and have doubted it for decades in practice. From a normative point of view, this rational assumption ignores the environmental, emotional and psychological aspects tied to our decisions. Shefrin (2000) and others, such as, Thaler, (1999) advocate a descriptive rather than a normative model that would take in emotional and cognitive constraints. This perspective has led to the development of behavioural finance as a corrective to traditional theory. Thaler (1999) suggested that people will commit predictable errors, even data exist. More recent research supports a perspective of financial rationality as a continuum influenced by cognition, emotion and the environment, rather than as a binary characteristic representing rational perfection.

Behavioural Economics

Behavioural economics incorporates psychology into economic decision-making, focussing on how imperfect humans, rather than perfect agents, engage in economic decisions. For instance, Kahneman and

Tversky (1979) introduced Prospect Theory, which posits that individuals frame their evaluations of outcomes around a reference point and exhibit extreme loss aversion - in other words, the pain of a loss outweighs the enjoyment of a gain of the same size.

Other concepts, such as mental accounting (Thaler, 1985) and the tendency for framing effects to occur, plus the fact that people can exhibit time-inconsistent preferences, combine to show that how alternative financial opportunities are presented or perceived strongly affects people's financial decisions, especially under conditions of uncertainty and long-term decision making. Behavioural economics changes our understanding of economic rationality.

Cognitive Bias

Cognitive biases refer to consistent patterns of irrational decision-making due to people's limitations in thinking and cognition. In finance, cognitive biases affect risk perceptions and cause decisions to be made that are not optimal, even with adequate facts available.

The most noticeable bias is known as overconfidence, whereby individuals over-estimate their knowledge and their ability to control situations. Barber and Odean (2001) showed that too much confidence leads to excessive trading activity and higher costs while gaining too low a return as a

result of the previous biases. The “anchoring” bias indicates that individuals allow or do not discount earlier reference points to form a valuation or nearly always contribute to the market being mispriced (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).

“Confirmation” bias supports the tendency for people to find information in support of existing psychological beliefs or reasons to reinforce a destructive bubble in the current market. “Loss aversion” induces a bias that causes individuals to regard the pain of loss in greater measure than the gain of pleasure (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). “Mental accounting” (Thaler, 1985) explains the value someone places on money based on the source of that money or what they intend to do with the money—in other words, creating arbitrary, often irrational, differences between “earned” money and “windfall” money. The above biases collectively confirm the continual divergence between the actual behaviour of investors and measure theory.

Investor Psychology

Investor psychology looks at the influence behind our financial decisions based on emotional breakouts, personality traits, and cognitive routines. Pompian (2006) identified investments as having four behaviours: cautious, impulsive, methodical, and individualistic. Lo and Repin (2002) used physiological measurements to indicate that people's emotional arousal and stress could have significant effects on trading.

Investor sentiment is often aligned with market volatility, resulting in herd behaviour, panic selling, or speculative bubbles. This indicates that investor psychology fills the gap between economic rationality and emotional decision-making while affirming that financial minded attitudes and decisions establish that financial markets are equally psychological ecosystems as they are numerical systems.

Affective Finance

Affective finance considers emotions as direct influences on financial decision-making. Loewenstein et al. (2001) introduced the risk-as-feelings theory in which they suggest emotional reactions to risk may vary from cognitive assessments of the same situation. Shiv et al. (2005), found that diminished responses to emotions may result in more stable investment behaviours due to lower impulsivity.

Emotion-related phenomena such as fear, greed, and regret have been shown in the literature to manifest in altered risk tolerance, asset pricing, and

market behaviour, especially in extraordinary events. Therefore, affective finance isn't to abandon behavioural finance; rather it expands the sub-field of behavioural finance to include the neuropsychological basis of economic behaviour.

Heuristics and Biases in Financial Decision-Making

Heuristics are methods of mentally simplifying real life decision-making under uncertainty. Although they serve useful purposes in people's everyday lives, in cases of more complex financial decisions heuristics will simply produce systematic biases. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) showed how heuristics, such as availability and representativeness, affect the perception of risk as well as the estimation of probabilities.

Heuristics in finance can produce bias that causes investors to overly react to market news, panic out of the stock market during downturns, or be overly optimistic to the upside during a market boom. Heuristics ultimately challenge the rational choice theory, indicating that decisions are usually intuitive, not calculated.

Research Gap

While a large amount of literature has explored bounded rationality, cognitive biases, and emotional reasoning as separate constructs, studies that simultaneously examine the role of emotional and cognitive limitations in financial rationality are scarce. We're just starting the process of designing integrated models that may be able to circumvent both emotional reasoning and cognitive biases between true decision-making. This study suggests an integrated model of financial rationality that seeks to develop a framework that will capture this type of decision-making within emotional and cognitive constraints.

Problem Statement

Despite the growing amount of financial literacy programs as well as advanced informational systems and decision-support technologies, irrational financial behaviours occur in civil and institutional spheres. Classical finance theory posits that decisions are made rationally, yet decisions in the real world have deep emotional and cognitive influences. This gulf between normative and actual behaviours suggests the need for a behavioural analysis of financial rationality.

This study takes up this challenge by exploring how bounded rationality, emotional reasoning, heuristics, and cognitive biases inform and together

influence financial decision making in the real world. The hope is that this study will be important for financial education and regulation and policy making with more regard for the realities of human incidence.


Research Objectives

- To evaluate the shortcomings of financial rationality.
- To examine how bounded rationality influences financial decisions.
- To consider emotional transparency as it pertains to financial behaviour.
- To categorise and recognise common cognitive biases and heuristics.

Research Hypothesis

- H1: Decision-makers with limited access to information, time pressure, and cognitive limitations tend to satisfice rather than optimise financial decisions.
- H2: Emotions such as fear, greed, remorse and overconfidence significantly influence risk perceptions and investment decisions in uncertainty.
- H3: Cognitive biases such as overconfidence, anchoring and confirmation bias significantly lead to irrational financial decisions.
- H4: Heuristics such as availability, recognition, and affect-based reasoning led to systematic errors in financial judgements.

Conceptual Framework: Behavioural Financial Decision-Making



RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

By means of an exploratory, qualitative research methodology, this study identifies the behavioural- and psychosocial-related aspects of financial decision-making. To capture varying opinions about behavioural dimensions, semi-structured, in-depth interviews and focus groups were conducted with

retail or individual investors, financial advisors, and policy officials. Purposive and snowball sampling methods were utilized for choosing which retail investor participants, taking into account age, investment behaviour and experience.

Data collection methods included open-ended interviews, reflective journals using critical thinking exercises and different forms of observational notes

that will capture diverse perspectives for triangulation. For a more comprehensive understanding of the interplay between emotion and cognition while making financial decisions, the study will also audit characteristics of voice, tone, and body language simultaneously. As such, this research allows for examination of the subjective interpretations related to both logically rational and non-rational financial decisions.

Analytical Theme

Thematic analysis led to the development of six behavioural domains of financial rationality: Bounded rationality, emotional reasoning, cognitive bias, heuristics, investor psychology, and affective finance. Each account showed similar behavioural forms.

Bounded rationality was illustrated through statements indicating pressure from time and information overload. Decisions based on fear, remorse, or fervent optimism can be categorized under emotional thinking. Decisions based on confirmation and overconfidence were heuristics or cognitive bias. Altogether these themes illustrate how emotional and cognitive shortcuts can impact financial decisions in unreasonable ways.

Statistical Techniques

Although the study is qualitative in nature, it has quantitative validation through statistical testing and factor analysis.

The narratives of the participants demonstrated the relationship of logic and emotions:"

"I wasn't comparing; I was just listening to what my colleague was saying."

"I knew the numbers didn't add up, but I had a gut feeling it would bounce back."

"I saw others buying, and I didn't want to be the only one not buying."

These comments demonstrate the availability heuristics, emotional reasoning, and herding effects.

A Chi-Square Test ($\chi^2 = 29.83$, $df = 1$, $p < 0.05$) established significant relationships between investor type and overconfidence bias; that retail

investors are more likely to overestimate or trust their intuition relative to institutional investors, supporting the behavioural finance perspective.

Sample Size Justification

Instead of statistical power, the decision to recruit 250 participants was based on thematic saturation and heterogeneity. Ample heterogeneity was utilized to attract a diverse participant pool of urban and semi-urban investors, financial professionals, and policymakers, all potentially differing in decision-making processes based on experience, risk tolerance, and emotionality. This heterogeneity in participants aids in a more nuanced behavioural understanding of financial rationality and promotes the generalizability of findings to banks, MSMEs, and retail investors.

Implications

The Chi-Square Test has a significance threshold of less than 0.05. Consequently, the alternative hypothesis is accepted and the null hypothesis is rejected. The data indicates that satisfaction with the rewards and incentives offered by UPI apps is significantly correlated with gender. Overall, the empathy and reasoning aspects of client behaviour should be considered by the financial advisors and strategists to provide individualised support. This study, by presenting financial rationality in the light of behavioural economics, aids in developing a more realistic and user-centred comprehension of financial decision-making.

Chi-Square Test

Given the high sample size ($n > 250$), the Chi-Square Test is well-suited to analyse connections such as:

The link between investor type (retail vs. institutional) and cognitive biases such as overconfidence or anchoring. The association between age group and dependence on heuristics (for example, availability or representativeness). The relationship between financial literacy and vulnerability to emotional reasoning in investment decisions.

Investor Type	Overconfident	Not Overconfident	Total
Retail Investors (n=150)	105	45	150
Institutional Investors (n=100)	35	65	100
Total	140	110	250

The derived test statistic is $\chi^2 = 29.83$, with one degree of freedom. At a significance level of $\alpha = 0.05$,

the critical value from the Chi-Square distribution table is 3.841. The estimated value far exceeds the

crucial threshold; hence, the null hypothesis of independence is rejected.

This finding suggests a statistically significant relationship between investor type and overconfidence bias. In particular, retail investors are much more likely than institutional investors to be

overconfident. This finding is consistent with the literature on behavioural finance, which suggests that retail investors frequently over-rate their ability to forecast, depend more on intuition than on analysis, and engage in excessive trading behaviour which is often attributed to overconfidence.

Rotated Component Matrix Extraction: Principal Component Analysis | Rotation: Varimax | Sample Size: 250

Item Statement	Factor 1 Cognitive Bias	Factor 2 Emotional Reasoning	Factor 3 Heuristic Use
I feel confident even without full information	0.81	0.25	0.18
I ignore contradictory data if I believe I'm right	0.74	0.29	0.22
I rely on my first instinct when investing	0.78	0.21	0.32
I avoid investing when I feel anxious	0.18	0.85	0.21
I regret financial decisions frequently	0.22	0.79	0.27
I make decisions based on how I feel	0.26	0.83	0.19
I invest in brands I recognise	0.31	0.24	0.76
I follow trends I see in the media	0.28	0.22	0.81
I repeat strategies that worked before	0.34	0.19	0.78

The factor analysis revealed three significant behavioural factors who encountered during their investment decision making. Factor 1 (Cognitive Bias) represents the following: overconfidence and selective memory. In this pattern, investors are compelled to use gut instinct and ignore contradictory evidence. Factor 2 (Emotional Reasoning) represents the complete gambit of feelings who are evoked in people, from anxiety to regret to decisions made on the basis of their moods, all of which led to emotional decisions.

Factor 3 (Heuristic Use) would suggest belief in simple quick and easy method of coming to conclusions by such things as brand awareness, trend following in their heads etc. Now, all of these bundled up illustrate not just the extent to which psychology plays a role in economic behaviour, but affirms the conclusion of this study that, despite the flattening of quantification espoused, the forces of human behaviour produce errors, even here in decision making.

Portfolio Simulation Framework

Investor Type	Behavioral Profile	Assumed Strategy	Expected Outcome
Rational Investor	Low bias across all factors	Diversified, long-term, data-driven	Stable returns, lower volatility
Cognitive-Biased Investor	High overconfidence, selective reasoning	Frequent trading, concentrated bets	High volatility, potential short-term gains
Emotionally Reactive Investor	High anxiety, regret, mood-driven decisions	Reactive exits, delayed entries	Missed opportunities, lower returns
Heuristic-Driven Investor	Brand/trend-following, repetition	Herd behavior, familiarity bias	Moderate returns, exposed to market fads

Investor Type	Annualized Return (%)	Volatility (%)	Max Drawdown (%)
Rational Investor	11.2	8.5	-18.0
Cognitive-Biased Investor	7.6	15.3	-32.5
Emotionally Reactive	5.1	10.8	-25.7
Heuristic-Driven	6.8	12.4	-28.9

The model, which depicted four investor archetypes: rational, cognitively biased, emotionally

reactive, rules based, produced various performance results over a five-year horizon. Rationales who were

fact and discipline liable accrued the best returns, “steady returns with a 20% attrition rate of returns due to volatility and down periods”. In contrast, the cognitive-biased investors who suffered from self-importance and selective reasoning saw their performance volatile and their losses larger. Emotionally reactive investors who are also anxious and regretful usually exited the markets too soon and entered too late, thus losing the significant growth period and reaping reduced returns. Heuristic value-based investors who rely on recognition and trend-following, not only maintained good performance

but also were the first to be hit by market fads and crowd. The results support the main hypothesis of the study that the influence of behaviour-motivated biases on personal finance decisions is much greater than the numbers themselves. The investor's psychological profile is what causes the variance in portfolio outcomes, which then calls for the provision of highly customised financial education and bias-aware advisory frameworks. When diagnostics based on behaviour are applied to portfolio design, the practitioners are enabled to invest in a way that is consistent with their clients' long-term financial objectives.

Risk Profiling Table Based on Behavioural Traits

Investor Profile	Dominant Behavioral Trait	Risk Tolerance	Decision Style	Portfolio Implication
Rational Risk-Taker	Low bias across all factors	High	Analytical, goal-oriented	Diversified, long-term growth
Overconfident Trader	Cognitive Bias (Factor 1)	Inflated (perceived)	Impulsive, self-assured	High turnover, concentrated bets, volatile returns
Emotionally Reactive Investor	Emotional Reasoning (Factor 2)	Low	Affective, loss-averse	Defensive allocation, poor timing, missed gains
Heuristic-Follower	Heuristic Use (Factor 3)	Moderate	Familiarity-driven, trend-sensitive	Herd behavior, exposure to market fads

Behavioural Scoring Index Table

Score Range	Investor Category	Behavioral Traits	Decision-Making Implications
0–25	Rational Investor	Minimal bias; high analytical discipline	Consistent, goal-oriented decisions; suitable for strategic planning
26–50	Moderate Bias	Occasional heuristics or emotional triggers	Inconsistent decisions; benefits from guided advisory
51–75	High Behavioral Vulnerability	Overconfidence, regret, trend-following	Reactive trading; prone to timing errors
76–100	Severe Behavioral Distortion	Emotion or bias-dominated decision-making	High risk of poor outcomes; requires behavioral intervention

A Behavioural Scoring Index (BSI) was created to measure the extent to which investors were making decisions based on biases. It was initially conceived as a factor analysis project. Factor loadings from the rotated component matrix were then used to assign a weight to each behavioural item that was proportionate to its contribution to the latent construct. The resulting participants' scores were

aggregated across three dimensions – cognitive bias, emotional reasoning, and heuristic use – to yield a composite score which ranged from 0 to 100.

Scores from 0 to 25 are allocated to rational investors who are being minimally influenced by behaviour. Such individuals exhibit strong analytical capacity and therefore make reliable decisions.

The range of 26-50 yields has moderate bias,

which is associated with occasional emotional responses or heuristic thinking. In such a case, the investor may not have a consistent approach, though the inconsistencies would not be large enough to cause great distortions.

Scores of 51-75 indicate a high degree of susceptibility to the behavioural revolution,

especially in turbulent markets. Chief among the psychological aspects of these investors include overconfidence, regret, and trend-following.

Scores of 76-100 indicate a complete expert who is just to the judgment of the market, for the winner in the market can depend on which one dialectically convinces the market of his position.

Monte Carlo Simulation Results

Investor Profile	Mean Ending Value (₹)	Standard Deviation (₹)	Probability of Loss (%)	Max Drawdown (%)
Rational Risk-Taker	₹16,20,000	₹2,80,000	8.2%	-18.0%
Overconfident Trader	₹13,40,000	₹4,90,000	26.7%	-32.5%
Emotionally Reactive Investor	₹11,80,000	₹3,60,000	34.5%	-25.7%
Heuristic-Follower	₹12,60,000	₹4,10,000	29.1%	-28.9%

The Monte Carlo Simulation contributes a dynamic understanding of the manner in which the behaviour of the investors distorts portfolio outcomes in relation to unpredictable market conditions. After simulating 1 000 investment paths over 5 periods for four investors with differing characteristics, the results showed great diversity in the final return accrued. Of the rationally minded investors, one of whose biased behaviour was low together with effective analytical discipline, the average value of the final portfolio was ₹ 16.2 lakhs, accompanied by little volatility and only a probability of loss of 8.2 per cent. In direct contrast, traders who were overconfident and subject to cognitive bias evinced increased risk taking, through frequent trading, with the effect of greater drawdowns (-32.5 per cent) and a probability of capital erosion of 26.7 per cent. Least effective was the emotively reactive investor class, under the influence of findings of anxiety and regret, having the least favourable result, a lower average ending value (₹. 11.8 lakhs) and a greater risk of loss than any of the classes of investor over a period (-34.5 per cent).

Behavioural traits are not coincidental, they are predictable. Hence, if volatility, resultant from bias driven activity and probabilities of loss, are measurable, this simulation is an endorsement of the principle that the qualities of behaviour have to be taken into consideration in the portfolio building technique and investor profiling. For these reasons, it is appropriate to emphasise the practico-utility which may flow as a result of adoption of psychiatric

diagnostic tools in the investment advisory and academic fields.

FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

The research explored the impact of behavioural biases on financial decision-making, counteracting the misconception that investors make purely rational calculations. Researchers utilized factor analysis to identify three critical behaviour-related factors: heuristics, emotional reasoning, and cognitive bias.

The latter two represent the affective and intuitive factors that play a key role in influencing how we invest our funds. Most of the participants were collectively in the mid-to-high rank of the behavioural bias scale, meaning everyone was somewhat off kilter, and could be interpreted as such. Risk profiling identified a difference in the risk tolerance between its perceived form by the investor and the actual risk tolerance of the investor, especially for those who were emotionally stable and confident of their risk tolerance.

The "Behavioural Scoring Index" (BSI) successfully categorized investors within the broad confines of relative bias. As such, it demonstrates possible ways to develop advising models which consider measurable elements of an individual psychological assessment. Logical investors who could reasonably understand the implications of the information presented and were prepared to act accordingly were found to beat other subjective information investors when simulating portfolios via "Monte Carlo" modelling. In short, they

demonstrated, as an example, that dislocation of volatility, randomness of returns, and drawdowns due to volatility would create opportunities for wealth growth.

Ultimately, it is behavioural factors—not only data—which will determine our going financial choices. By educating "resilient investing behaviour," the researchers recommend the continued application of bias diagnostics to reduce financial bias and influence the development of policies and practices going forward.

DISCUSSION OF THE STUDY

The results are consistent with the behavioural finance thesis in showing just how strongly cognitive, emotional, and heuristic biases influence our financial decisions. We showed that the three hidden behavioural dimensions - Cognitive Bias, Emotional Reasoning, and Heuristic Use - represent measurable psychological characteristics that mistakenly affect investing performance time and again.

The second dimension, Cognitive Bias is representative of meaning psychological characteristics like selective attention and overconfidence. The Emotional Reasoning dimension includes behaviours driven by anxiety and regret, and emotional impulses such as choosing positions based on moods. The Heuristic Use dimension indicates behaviour such as a reliance on movement-following heuristics or the 'branding' of stocks and positions. All three of these are reflected in variances in Portfolio Volatility, Trading Frequency and Risk Tolerance.

The simulation of portfolios and Monte Carlo modelling further strengthened the predictive power of the behavioural confluence. Rational investors invested and held, exhibiting less erratic behaviour and capital retention, while overconfident and emotional investors exhibited unpredictable results, greater loss, and larger risk positions.

The risk profiling analysis also confirmed that risk assessment tools fail to capture the psychological determinants of actual risk behaviour and that perceived tolerance does not align with actual risk behaviour—in particular of consumers showing a high propensity for cognitive bias. The Behavioural Scoring Index thus aims to show that the common tools of identifying and measuring risk have approached this case too narrowly, revealing a significant shortcoming in how 'tools' and 'stations' are designed in financial systems. The BSI in turn aims to originate from an objective standpoint of providing an objective means to categorise and

appropriately advise investors.

The findings thus expose that while financial knowledge is necessary and very important, it does not guarantee a rational approach. We might argue that our financial systems would do well to adopt a behaviour-aware strategy that acknowledges the need for behaviour around diagnosis, educational, and then personal advising from the start, rather than cracked- and-fixing mode down the line. Such an approach would help default investors down a more appropriate avenue of recognise-and-manage bias-driven risks.

CONCLUSION

Using factor analysis, risk profiling, portfolio simulation and Monte Carlo modelling, we show that behavioural biases - gripes not mere numbers - can deterministically clearly influence decisions made by more positive behaviours in cognitive bias, emotional reasoning, and heuristics - resulting in bad behaviours like overtrading, mistimed buy or sell transactions, and risk reward misalignment. Using our Behavioural Scoring Index gamification to add a dimension of bias severity to our recommendation model and tweak our recommendations closes that gap.

The simulation shows that the rational investor real terms of this long-term money work generate higher returns and less volatility than its closed hemmed stupid peers, using the same data. We predict a new approach of putting that psychology diagnostic on the end of a stick into our mosaicist financial education and advisory approaches and then using that to grow the pie for everyone by making it investable through improvements in financial literacy and market resilience through inclusion and improvement.

RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Future studies will widen the net of behavioural profiling to different population segments and markets, with longitudinal studies tracking how cognitive and emotional biases evolve with time and major shocks and recessions or policy changes—does investor behaviour adapt dynamically to macro shocks?

Future research might also see behavioural scoring blended with portfolio management and rebalancing in real time, with portfolios automatically rebalancing based on investor mood or bias strength. Applying the Behavioural Scoring Index to assets such as crypto, ESG funds and pension schemes may reveal specific bias tendencies for risk perception per asset class.

Experimental research comparing bias-aware algorithmic trading systems and naive algorithmic trading platforms will answer the question of whether a behaviourally conscious AI can trade better and more profitably per seconds of delight;

comparative work contrasting the behaviour of retail investors with our models as opposed to that of bank or hedge fund investors—how does professional training modulate behavioural proclivities, and what implications does this have for financial education?

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