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TRAFFIC POLICE DEVIANCE: A PREDICTOR OF NONCOMPLIANCE TO TRAFFIC RULES BY PUBLIC TRANSPORTERS ALONG ATIMBO AKPABUYO ROAD, CROSS RIVER STATE, NIGERIA.

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ABSTRACT

This paper anchored on the deterrent theory of punishment, the social exchange theory and techniques of neutralization theory to examine traffic police deviance as a predictor of non-compliance to traffic rules by public drivers along Atimbo-Akpabuyo, Cross River State Nigeria. The correlational survey design was deployed with a sample of 99 drivers. A self-designed questionnaire was used to gather data after it demonstrated a test-retest reliability coefficient of 0.84. Hypotheses were tested using one sample t-test and simple Linear Regression. Findings established that the observed rate of illegal collections by FRSC personnel, non-regular renewal of vehicle particulars and overloading of vehicles among public drivers in the study area were respectively significant. Findings also, indicted a significant predictive effect of illegal collections by FRSC personnel on the non-regular renewal of vehicle papers and on the overloading among public drivers along Atimbo-Akpabuyo road. The study recommended that the government should engage a secrete independent agency to monitor the activities of FRSC on the roads and punish infractions. Also, that FRSC should work with the authorities at the parks to ensure that vehicles and drivers loading at the parks have up to date vehicle documents and that no vehicle overloads from the park.

KEYWORDS: Traffic Police Deviance, Commercial Drivers, Noncompliance to Traffic Rule, FRSC Personnel, Deterrent Theory, Exchange Theory, Compromise, Police Corruption, Techniques of Neutralization Theory.

1. INTRODUCTION

In the world today, only the Kingdom of Bhutan exist without traffic lights yet they have other ways of regulating the traffic behavior among road users (Hall, 2025). It follows that there is no known organized country in the world today that completely lack a system of putting the behaviors of road users in check. This points to the importance of traffic policing in every organized society. In Nigeria, regulation of the transportation sector for the purpose of safety and security of road users is taken as an important responsibility of the State (Adisa, Alabi & Adejoh, 2018). Accordingly, the Nigerian Government has established specialized regulatory traffic agencies to help in accomplishing this task. At the Federal level, the Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC) was established in 1988 (Akinyoola, 2019), and most Nigerian States Government have also established theirs with different nomenclature to complement the FRSC. Lagos State, has Lagos State Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA) (LASTMA nd) in Oyo State they are called Oyo State Road Traffic Management Authority (Oshokha, 2025), Edo State has Edo State Traffic Management Agency, (Edo State Government, 2026) Cross River State has Traffic Management and Regulatory Agency (TRAMRA) (Abasi-Abasi, 2026). All these traffic agencies generally involved in traffic policing are hereby referred to as traffic police.

Deviance is generally seen as behaviours that violate rules and norms of a group (Ayuk, Ekuri, Andrew, Ebagu, Chimobi, Omono, & Abuo, 2021). Police deviance refers to inappropriate actions taken by police officers in connection with their official duties (Maher, 2015). From the foregoing, traffic police deviance (TPD) may be viewed as the violation of rules, norms and laws by traffic police personnel in the connection to their traffic policing work. Pribadi, Fitrianti, Irfani, Rini, Zulkaida (2007) chose to use the term traffic police misconduct which they defined as violations of ethics, abuse of power, and also aggressive behavior by traffic police officer in dissonance with the established professional standards of police officers. Traffic police deviance is expressed through various means, ranging from abuse of power, bribery, to violations of traffic rules by officers (Nizam, 2020), excessive use of force and abuse of authority (Albrecht, 2024). Traffic police deviance has been a matter of concern for many years across the many nations of the world and the reasons for its widespread may not too different from the same reason advanced for police deviance which include poor salaries, poor training, poor welfare, poor monitoring, greed (Enkeremadu 2017; Andrew,

Ebiekpi, Udo & Inameti, 2022; Andrew & Odum 2024, Abdulbasit & Faruk, 2024) etc.

Violation of road rules is especially commonly noticed among public transporters because like some have observed, they are not usually inspected like the private car drivers (Farooq, Ramzan & Zakir; 2021; Sunday & Alade 2022) or maybe because the road is their offices and as such are more seen on the roads compared to private drivers who are largely seen early while going to offices and late in the day while returning from offices. Little wonder why they accounted for 67.7% of road crashes in 2024 alone for instance (Okpi, 2026). Similarly, in Pakistan, studies revealed that commercial vehicles were responsible 53.5% of the traffic violations committed and that there was 234 % increase in commercial vehicle crashes from 2013 to 2016 on motorways (Ministry of Communications, 2018). The violation of traffic rules commonly observed among these drivers in Nigeria take various forms such as drink driving, driving without lights, without functional fire extinguishers, emitting excessive smoke while driving, driving without license or expired license, driving without seatbelt, driving with faulty vehicles, over speeding, beating of traffic light, overloading, among other faults (Sunday & Alade, 2022). This just like older studies (Hyder, Ghaffar, & Masood, 2000; Kayani, King & Fleiter, 2011; Batool, Carsten, & Jopson, 2012;) have found, suggests that traffic regulation is yet to be enforced with the required vigor to achieve appreciable level of deterrence. This is in spite of the daily heavy presence of traffic police on Nigerian public motorways which Atimbo- Akpabuyo road is a part of. The prevailing situation signals a disturbing burgeoning problem which the recent applied measures have obviously not been able to resolve. Unfortunately, various violations of the basic traffic regulations have resulted to the untimely death of many (Iversen, 2004; Sunday & Alade, 2022). FRSC corps marshal, Shehu Mohammed announced that 5,421 road traffic death occurred in Nigeria in 2024 following the 9,570 reported crashes and this figure have been on the increase (Okpi, 2026). Most of the road accidents have been linked to drivers' recklessness, defective vehicles and poor enforcement of safety laws (Opara, 2025). Besides deaths, is likelihood that some survivors may be left with permanent scares and physical disabilities which eventually dwindles their productivity and economic relevance to the society.

There are explanations for why public transporters may defy traffic rules even right before the presence of traffic police. Some include financial exploitation by traffic personnel (Human Right

Watch 2010, Njoku, 2026), substance abuse, bribe collection by traffic police (Oleinik, 2016), low surveillance of the road, violators connection with elites (Arain & Arain 2016) violation by the traffic police personnel themselves, selective enforcement, weak enforcement, (Farooq, et al. 2021) among others. Quite a number of researches have explored police misconduct, economic benefit (Pribadi, Fitrianti, Irfani, Rini, Zulkaida, 2007; Maher, 2015; Albrecht, 2024; Abdulbasit & Faruk, 2024) from various dimensions and research on traffic violations by drivers has also grown (Arrive Alive 2015; Farooq, et al, 2021; Sunday & Alade, 2022; Arrive Alive 2023). However, only a few researches if any exist have particularly considered traffic police deviance in relation to the noncompliance of public transporters to traffic regulations along Atimbo-Akpabuyo road despite its necessity for the development of traffic security and sanity. For instance, non-regular renewal of drivers' license may put in doubt to the fitness of driver and may rob the government of revenue and renewal of vehicle papers will help; non-regular renewal of vehicle papers may also put in doubt the eligibility of vehicle ownership and fitness as well as may rob the government of revenue. By extension, the ability of the government to renovate the road and to construct new ones. Again, overloading of vehicles may result in accidents as in when a luggage mistakenly drops while a vehicle is on motion and the following vehicle climbs on or hit against the flying luggage. To this end, the FRSC in collaboration with the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and other agencies have made several official resolves to sanitize the road by eliminating corrupt practices and ensuring traffic rule compliance (ICPC, 2025; Oko, 2026). But these resolves have not brought about the desired change in this regard. Transporters have also carried out some protest against traffic agencies exploitations (Lawal, 2023; Dennis, 2026) and the exploitation continues till date. This research thus intended to cover that gap by examining FRSC deviance as and noncompliance to traffic rules by public transporters along Atimbo-Akpabuyo road in Cross River State Nigeria.

1.1. Specific Objectives

This study specifically is designed:

- i. To establish the rate of non-regular renewal of vehicle particulars among public drivers along Atimbo-Akpabuyo road, Cross River State, Nigeria.
- ii. to find out the rate of non-regular renewal of vehicle particulars among public drivers along

Atimbo-Akpabuyo road, Cross River State, Nigeria

- iii. To find out the rate of overloading of vehicles by public transporters along Atimbo-Akpabuyo road, Cross River State, Nigeria
- iv. To establish the relationship between illegal collections by FRSC personnel from public drivers and the non-regular renewal of vehicle documents by public drivers along Atimbo-Akpabuyo road Cross River State, Nigeria.
- v. To establish the relationship between illegal collections and overloading of vehicles by public drivers along Atimbo-Akpabuyo road Cross River State, Nigeria.

1.2. Hypotheses

- H₀₁. The rate of non-regular renewal of vehicle particulars among public drivers along Atimbo-Akpabuyo road, Cross River State, Nigeria is not significant
- H₀₂. The rate of nonrenewal of vehicle particulars among public drivers along Atimbo-Akpabuyo road, Cross River State, Nigeria is not significant
- H₀₃. The rate of overloading of vehicles by public transporters along Atimbo-Akpabuyo road, Cross River State, Nigeria is not significant.
- H₀₄. There are no significant predictive effects of illegal collections by FRSC officials on non-regular renewal of vehicle particulars by public transporters along Atimbo-Akpabuyo road in Cross River State
- H₀₅. There are no significant predictive effects of illegal collections by FRSC officials on overloading of vehicle by public transporters along Atimbo-Akpabuyo road in Cross River State

1.3. Theoretical Consideration

The current study anchors on the deterrent theory of punishment, the social exchange theory and techniques of neutralization theory.

The deterrent theory grew out of the work of Beccaria (1764) and Bentham (1789) who led the classical school of criminology. The theory believes that swift, severe and consistent punishment will discourage undesired behavior and encourage the desired behavior (Ayuk, Okpa & Eshiotse, 2024). Applying the deterrent theory to the current study, will imply that the level of compliance to traffic rules by public transporters is positively related to how punishment is severely, consistently and swiftly applied on violators of traffic rules (Nugroho, Arasyid, & Wirayuda, 2024), The theory implies that

if there is a low application of swift, severe and consistent punishment on violators of traffic rules, there will be lower compliance and vice versa

The social exchange theory on the other hand believes that the *quid pro quo* motive of give and take governs interactions (Andrew, Jacob, Okon, Atu, & Otu 2025). The value proposition, a major component of the exchange theory holds that a person will continue to exhibit a behavior so long as what they get in reciprocity is valuable to them (Homans, 1958). Applying the theory to the current study will suggest that relationship between FRSC Personnel deviance and compliance of public transporters to traffic rules depends on the benefits each party derive from the relationship. For the personnel who takes bribe to allow nonconformity to rules by transporters, they have persisted in that behavior because they enjoy the money they collect. On the other hand, the transporters who pay bribe without and persistently deviate from basic traffic rules, do so because they enjoy economic benefit from noncompliance (Farooq, et al. 2021) which their payment of bribe affords them the opportunity to. The public transporters also enjoy protection from prosecution in exchange of the bribes they pay

Techniques of Neutralization Theory was proposed by Sykes and Matza (1957) basically to explain juvenile delinquency. The theory argues so long as deviant continues to find psychological defense mechanism to justify their deviance, they will likely persist in it. According to theorists, the justification for deviance behavior is done through a process they called the techniques of neutralization. They proposed five of these techniques as follows: Denial of responsibility, denial of injury, denial of the victim, condemning the condemners. As it applies to the current study, deviant FRSC personnel who take bribe may deny responsibility when they blame the Nigerian 'system' for their action and so might the deviant driver. On the part of the drivers, traffic rule breaking may be justified as a way of registering resistance against perceived injustice, as a result of their perception that the system is fundamentally corrupt (Sahin, 2014). The deviant transporters and the deviant traffic personnel denial also perpetuate their deviant behavior because they may believe that no one is hurt. Hence, the personnel collect the bribe for overloading or seatbelt offence and the drivers who violate the rules claim that the offence do not harm anyone, if anything, they are even assisting the commuters to transport themselves and their goods. Denial of victims here by the deviant traffic Corps could take the form of saying that the public transporters deserved to be extorted because they can

never meet up with the total safety requirements for plying the roads and that they are making extra money by violating the traffic rules. Sieber (2012:20) reported the lamentation of some public transporter in Zimbabwe who said that "however perfect a vehicle might be, the police would always find a fault and demand a bribe, failure of which they would issue several tickets for minor offences such as a cracked mirror or a dirty bus". The traffic police condemn the condemner by stating that everyone including those condemning their actions take bribe and extort in their offices. The only difference is that theirs (traffic police) is on the road and more conspicuous for everyone to see. In the same way the transporters may say that everyone including those condemning their noncompliance (traffic police officers and other road users) to traffic rules too violate the rules. Finally, the two parties of deviance here- the traffic police and the public transporters may argue that they deviate to meet up with the financial demands of their families and especially for the corps with the financial daily delivery expectations of their superiors in the office.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The breakdown in ethical standards among officers is evident, as motorist interactions with police have increasingly become contentious rather than supportive (Mphidi & Pheiffer, 2025). Deviant police disregard agency policy, rules and regulations, societal expectations, and/or criminal law in five major ways namely corruption, criminality, excessive use of force, abuse of authority, and misconduct (Albrecht, 2024). Deviant traffic police officers, employ some methods to perpetrate their ills, namely manipulating offers for violations of fines on the spot so that this action can be exploited by individuals who will take half of it and the deposit will be less than the fine that the violator has given. Also, on the spot, unscrupulous individuals also often manipulate the violation articles committed against the violators so that the fees that will be paid will be minimal and the rest will go into the pockets of the traffic police officers (Nizam, 2020; Arrive Alive 2023). Studies on crime in South Africa revealed that corruption was most evident in encounters with traffic officers (Arrive Alive, 2015). Amnesty International (2014) contended that the police in Lagos state extort money and use police powers to brutalize commercial drivers within the city. The Federal Road Safety Corp officials in Nigeria charges ₦500 to ₦1000 at every checkpoint to wave checking commercial vehicles (Opara, 2025) even when their boss Mohammed has categorically frowned against it

with punishment threat for perpetrators stating clearly that FRSC is a live saving and not a money generating agency (Oko, 2026). Again, Amnesty International (2019) found the general perception towards road management agencies in Pakistan to be that of corruption and procedural injustice. Oleinik (2016) observed that the connection between corruption and road safety in Russia has sustainable character because all the parties involved win something. The Russian motorists are not just victims of extortion but also initiates bribery. This suggest that there is a mutual corrupt relationship between some of the motorists and traffic police. And where people know that they can offer bribe to avoid punishment, there is less likelihood that laws will be upheld.

Sieber (2012:20) noted that the reasons why truckers in India pay bribes, while plying the roads include overloading, "traffic violations, parking at no-parking places or entering in 'no entry zone', and in the payment of toll and other taxes like Octroi, sales tax, lack of proper documents and use of alcohol by truck drivers". To Akinkunmi & Anigbogu, (2018), bribes are paid to traffic police because about 80% of drivers have car-related problems, and see bribe to be a good alternative to having to bail out their vehicles or themselves from a police station. Ulo (2024) found that many drivers prefer to pay bribes to avoid needless obstacles to the daily economic activities that support them. According to Mphidi & Pheiffer (2025), motorists frequently report cases where officers allegedly demand bribes or engage in intimidation, pressuring them into non-compliant behaviour that fosters a climate of fear and mistrust. The perception of the Tshwane Metropolitan Police Department (TMPD) of South Africa as a corrupt institution has significantly affected public trust. Motorists, feeling targeted rather than protected, are less likely to cooperate with officers. According to criminologist Professor Witness Maluleke, behaviours of this kind, signals a critical loss of credibility within the TMPD, as the public doubts officers' intentions and the safety of engaging with them (Madihlaba, 2021). This loss of trust further generates a broader safety risk as motorists may disregard regulations or attempt to evade interactions with officers to avoid that being potential victims of police harassment or extortion (Ulo, 2024). Ensuing from this, the ethical issues within TMPD not only reduce the effectiveness of law enforcement but also jeopardizes road safety in Tshwane, endangering all road users (Mphidi & Pheiffer, 2025).

Tiwa (2024) in his qualitative study of Nigerian

police found that in practice, distrust of the police translates into three sets of behavior from the public which could be said to undermine compliance to the law of the land. First, people expect nothing good from the police and therefore crime victims rarely expect much help from them if they do. The second is that many Nigerians want to avoid any interaction with the police even when they have information that can help police investigation of crimes and the third is that many are convinced that most have been punished are either innocent or petty criminals.

Traffic police deviance besides the loss of public trust may also lead to the loss of legitimacy-right to exercise power. Zakar (2014) surmised that loss of police legitimacy is the reason that the police in the developing nations finds it difficult to maintain law and order. When legal authorities act in procedurally just ways, the resulting legitimacy that this engenders in turn encourages people to cooperate with officials and obey the laws they enforce (Tyler & Jackson, 2014, Bradford, 2014, Ulo, 2024). Thus, the legitimacy of traffic laws enforcement agencies is weakened by selective enforcement, (motivated by corruption) which gives drivers the impression that compliance is negotiable depending on financial incentives or personal relationships (Oleinik, 2016). Enforcement of law in Pakistan is often hindered by a patron-agent relationship (Arain & Arain 2016;) and the same in Lagos (Omappe, 2023). "if a driver has the appropriate connections, he will not be questioned no matter the number of traffic rules he violates. Even if they are apprehended by traffic police officers, the officers find themselves helpless in the face of a higher authority" (Farooq, Ramzan & Zakir 2021: 866). Omappe (2023) noted that commercial drivers in Lagos state do not comply with traffic regulations because most of them are impatient and always have their way with LASTMA officials as well as the police officers on the road. He also noted that many commercial drivers do not renew their vehicle documents after the first registration even till their buses get old. He alluded to the findings from Sunday PUNCH which showed that an average motorist fails to obey traffic lights and sometimes stop in the middle of the road to pick up passengers without negative sanction from the traffic authorities.

Sieber (2012) analyzing the dangers of corruption in the transport sector submitted that corruption may impact infrastructure supply, transport operations and services. In many industrialized and developing countries of the world the deterioration of the transport infrastructure caused by insufficient maintenance represents one of the largest

inefficiencies. Sieber (2012) observed further that, in general terms, the economic rates of return for road projects amounted to 40 % for road maintenance, 20 % for rehabilitation and only 10 % for new construction. Sieber concluded that if public funds are spent on investments for new infrastructure projects, while financial means for maintenance are not sufficient, large-scale diseconomies are generated. Still on the impact on traffic police deviance, Cavill & Sohail, (2007:18) contended that "The poor are more vulnerable in terms of being subjected to extortion, bribery because they often pay a disproportionately higher percentage of their incomes on bribes than wealthier citizens. For instance, a study by Bromley and Jeremy, (2011) on the transport costs for agricultural produce in West Africa revealed that since farmers are the poorest group in society, agricultural prices have a strong impact on poverty. A 10 % reduction in total transport costs (actual costs plus corruption costs) of onions from Niger can result in a 12–13 % increase of farm-gate prices to onion farmers. Similar elasticities are 2 % for cashew in Ghana and 7 % for shea butter in Mali. Thus, corruption has not only an enormous impact on farmer's revenues in general, but it also hits the poor smallholders hardest.

Researches on the relationship between police corruption and compliance to traffic rules have produced different outcomes. Tenkebe (2009) did a survey in Ghana, and found no evidence that police corruption experiences affected people's inclinations to cooperate with the police. Tankebe (2010), on the contrary, associated the public's perception on police corruption in Ghana to the notion that the force is bias, incompetent, and unreliable. Bradford, Huq, Jackson and Roberts (2014) in South Africa found a connection between the public's perception of police corruption and with illegitimacy of police institution. Similarly, Akinlabi (2017) in a Nigerian study discovered that the public felt obligation to obey the legal authorities and their moral proclivity with legal authorities were not influenced by authorities' unlawfulness. Nivette and Akoensi (2019) conducted research in Ghana using factorial survey design-based data and found that the public who were confronted with police corruption reported their displeasure with the police. Similarly, Desmond, Papachristos and Kirk, (2016) studied Milwaukee residents in Wisconsin, United States. Their analyses of emergency calls to the police department found that the exposure through media about police misconduct reduced residents' chances to reporting crimes to the police. The studies revealed that when public perceive that the police are corrupt their

compliance with laws and cooperation with police minimized. Using regression analysis, Abbas and Usman (2023)'s studies indicated an inverse significant relationship between police corruption and the public's compliance with traffic laws. Implying that as police corruption increases, compliance to traffic laws by the public reduces. It is in the same vein that Ulo (2024) contended that since the police are allies in crime to deviant drivers, the police fail to properly performance their tasks on the roadways thereby creating allowance for drivers to carry out their everyday activities without adhering to traffic laws and regulations.

3. METHODOLOGY

The survey (correlational) research design was employed for this study. This approach was considered because the research was tailored towards gathering samples of opinions and then correlating the collected data to determine the relationship between specified variables. Correlational research is a descriptive technique that indicates whether variables share something in common with each other (Andrew et al., 2024). The higher the correlation, the higher the degree of relatedness (Salkind, 2012) The study was carried out among registered public commercial drivers plying Atimbo- Akpabuyo road. Atimbo- Akpabuyo road is an international highway with the presence of check points by virtually all Nigerian security agencies namely, the Navy, the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS), The Nigerian Army, the Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC), and the Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA). The area was also known for intensive insecurity, cultism clashes and regular kidnapping with a lot of undeveloped or half-way developed properties. Traders use the road to Bakasi to buy items especially sea foods which they return to sell in Calabar and there is a market where traders go to sell their items at nwag Ekoi. From Etta-Agbo round about to Maternity Bus stop in Akpabuyo. 30-45 Minutes' drive covering 15-20kms Study population comprises of all 86 registered public transporters Eta-Agbor motor park and all the 33 registered drivers at Atimbo motor park. The study sample included 102 commercial drivers at these two parks who were purposively drawn from the population. The sample were made up of a minimum of drivers who have been in the business for up to 3 years minimum due to the necessity of experience for the authenticity of responses derived. The research instrument was a self-constructed questionnaire and was entitled 'Traffic Police Deviance: A Predictor of

Noncompliance to Traffic Rules by Public Transporters Questionnaire' (TPDAPNTR). The questionnaire has three sub-sections, with each dedicated to each of the variables of concern to the study. The first sub-section with 6 items generated data on illegal collections among FRSC officials from public transporters in the area, the second with six items generated data on noncompliance of public transporters to renewal of vehicle particulars, and the third with six items generated data on overloading of vehicles among public transporters in the study area. The items were designed in a frequency scale of Never (N), Rarely (R), Sometimes (S) Frequently (F), and Always (A). For all positive statements, the following points were attracted: Never (1), Rarely (2), Sometimes (3) Frequently (4), and Always (5). On the other hand, for every negative statement, 'N' attracted 5 points, 'R' attracted 4 points, 'S' attracted 3 points, 'F' attracted 2 points and A attracted 1 point.

The survey instrument was subjected to a "face validity" check by two experienced experts in test and measurements, and relevant corrections were made to ensure that the instrument met the needs of the study. The researcher measured internal consistency of the survey instrument through the use of the test-retest method. Accordingly, the questionnaire was first administered to twenty respondents at Etim Edem Park who travel across Local Government Areas within Cross River State as they share similar experience with the study sample. After a period of about ten -fifteen days (depending

on the availability of the drivers at the park), the same instrument was re-administered on the same respondents as a retest. The two sets of questionnaires were then analyzed using Pearson Product-Moment Correlation to test for internal consistency. This process yielded a correlation coefficient of 0.84, which suggested that the survey instrument was reliable. This conclusion is in consistency with Sekaran and Bougie (2016), who pontificated that any reliability index greater than 0.7 is taken to represent a satisfactory level of instrument reliability. The first two Hypotheses formulated for the study were tested using the One Sample T test and the third hypothesis was tested using Multiple linear regression analysis with the aid of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) V23. The study was authorized by the research committee of Arthur Jarvis University, and the consent of each respondent was duly obtained before the questionnaire was administered to respondents. Respondents were also told that they retained their rights to withdraw from the study at any point of the study.

4. RESULTS

4.1. Test of Hypotheses

H₀₁: The rate of Illegal collections by FRSC personnel from public drivers along Atimbo-Akpabuyo road, Cross River State, Nigeria is not significant

Table 1: Summary Of Results of One-Sample T-Test Analysis of the Rate of Illegal Collections by FRSC Personnel from Public Drivers Along Atimbo-Akpabuyo Road, Cross River State, Nigeria (N = 99).

Variable	$\bar{X}$	μ	SD	t-value	p-level
Illegal Collections	29.9798	15.00	.20101	741.500	.000

*P < .05, Df = 98; Std. Error Mean = 0.02020

The result in Table 1 indicates that the observed rate of illegal collections by FRSC personnel from public drivers in the study area is statistically significant at 0.05 alpha level ($t=741.500$; $p=0.000<.05$) with 98 degrees of freedom. The sample mean of 29.9798 is greater than the population mean of 15.00. On this premise, the null hypothesis was rejected while the alternative hypothesis was

accepted. This implies that illegal collections have become normative behavior among a good number of FRSC personnel as they go about their traffic policing function.

H₀₂: The rate of non-regular renewal of vehicle particulars among public drivers along Atimbo-Akpabuyo road, Cross River State, Nigeria is not significant

Table 2: Summary Of Results of One-Sample T-Test Analysis of the Rate of Non-Renewal of Vehicle Particulars Among Public Drivers Along Atimbo-Akpabuyo Road, Cross River State, Nigeria (N= 99).

Variable	$\bar{X}$	μ	SD	t-value	p-level
Illegal Collections	29.9596	15.00	.19791	752.101	.000

*P < .05, df = 98; Std. Error Mean = 0.01989

The result in Table 2 indicates that the observed rate of non-regular renewal of vehicle particulars by public drivers in the study area is statistically significant at 0.05 alpha level ($t=752.101$;

$p=0.000<.05$) with 98 degrees of freedom. The sample mean of 29.9596 is greater than the population mean of 15.00. On this premise, the null hypothesis was rejected while the alternative hypothesis was

accepted. This implies that no-regular renewal of vehicle particulars has become more like a normative behavior among an appreciable number of public drivers who ply the study area.

H₀₃: The rate of overloading of vehicles by public transporters along Atimbo-Akpabuyo road, Cross River State, Nigeria is not significant.

Table 3: Summary Of Results of One-Sample T-Test Analysis of the Rate of Overloading of Vehicle Among Public Drivers Along Atimbo-Akpabuyo Road, Cross River State, Nigeria (N = 99).

Variable	$\bar{X}$	μ	SD	t-value	p-level
Level of degradation of the culture of hard	29.9495	15.00	.26240	566.874	.000

***P < .05, df = 372; Std. Error Mean = 0.02637**

The result in Table 3 indicates that the observed rate of overloading of vehicles particulars by public drivers in the study area is statistically significant at 0.05 alpha level ($t=566.874$; $p=0.000<.05$) with 98 degrees of freedom. The sample mean of 29.9495 is greater than the population mean of 15.00. On this premise, the null hypothesis was rejected while the alternative hypothesis was accepted. This implies

that overloading of vehicle has become more like a normative practice among an appreciable number of public drivers who ply the study area.

H₀₄. There are no significant predictive effects of illegal collections by FRSC officials on non-regular renewal of vehicle particulars among public drivers along Atimbo-Akpabuyo road in Cross River State.

Table 4: Linear Regression Analysis of the Predictive Effect of Illegal Collections by FRSC Officials on Non-Regular Renewal of Vehicle Particulars Public Drivers Along Atimbo-Akpabuyo Road in Cross River State. (N=99).

Model summary						
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate		
1	.492 ^a	.242	.235	.17315		
ANOVA ^a						
Sources of Variation		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	.930	1	.930	31.027	.000 ^b
	Residual	2.908	97	.030		
	Total	3.838	98			
Coefficients ^a						
Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients		Collinearity Statistics		
				Tolerance	VIF	
(Constant)	15.429	2.609	Beta	t-value	P-value	
IC	.485	.087	.492	5.570	.000	1.000 1.000

*Significant ($P<.05$);

A. Dependent Variable: NRRVP

B. Predictors: (Constant), IC

Table 4 indicates the correlation coefficient ($R = .492$), the explained variance ($R^2 = .242$), and the adjusted R^2 ($Adj. R^2 = 0.235$) associated with the predictor variable. The correlation coefficient, which is an indicator of the model fit, is fair enough to establish that the estimated model in this study has a fit on the data. The model Adjusted R-square indicates that 24% of the total variations in non-regular renewal of vehicle particulars around its mean is explained by variations in the illegal collection's variables in the model, while the other 66% may be due to variation in extraneous variables. Therefore, this value of the $Adj. R^2$ indicates that the model has fair explanatory ability.

To examine the predictive effect of the predictor variable under the study on the criterion variable, the t-statistics, which test the null hypothesis that the coefficients for the predictor or independent variable

were observed, and was found to be statistically significant at the .05 level. Apparently, illegal collection by FRSC personnel (IC., $t=5.570$, $p=.000<0.05$) contributed significantly in predicting the non-regular renewal of vehicle particulars by public drivers. The beta coefficients ($\beta=.492$) indicated a positive predictive effect of Illegal Collections by FRSC Personnel on Non-regular renewal of vehicle particulars by public drivers. Beta values indicated that one unit of increase in the illegal collections by FRSC personnel increases about .492 units of non-regular renewal vehicle particulars.

Sequel to this result, the null hypothesis was jettisoned while the alternative hypothesis was retained. This means that there are significant predictive effects of illegal collections by FRSC personnel on the non-regular renewal of vehicle papers among public drivers along Atimbo-

Akpabuyo road, Cross River State, Nigeria. This result implies that the greater the rate of illegal collections by FRSC personnel, the greater the non-regular renewal of vehicle particulars among public driver along Atimbo-Akpabuyo road, Cross River State, Nigeria, and vice versa.

H₀₅. There are no significant predictive effects of illegal collections by FRSC officials on overloading of vehicle by public transporters along Atimbo-Akpabuyo road in Cross River State

Table 5: Linear Regression Analysis of the Predictive Effect of Illegal Collections by FRSC Personnel on Overloading of Vehicle by Public Drivers Along Atimbo-Akpabuyo Road in Cross River State. (N=99)

Model summary						
Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate		
1	.367 ^a	135	.126	.24530		
ANOVA ^a						
Sources of Variance		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F-value	P-value
1	Regression	.911	1	.911	15.135	.000 ^b
	Residual	5.837	97	.060		
	Total	6.747	98			

Coefficients ^a								
		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients			Collinearity Statistics	
		B	Std. Error	Beta	t-Value	P-Value	Tolerance	VIF
	(Constant)	15.571	3.696		4.213	.000		
	IC	.480	.123	.367	3.890	.000	1.000	1.000

^aSignificant (P<.05);

A. Dependent Variable: OL

B. Predictors: (Constant), IC

Table 5 indicates the correlation coefficient ($R = .367$), the explained variance ($R^2 = .135$), and the adjusted R^2 ($\text{Adj. } R^2 = .126$) associated with the predictor variable. The correlation coefficient, which is an indicator of the model fit, is fair enough to establish that the estimated model in this study has a fit on the data. The model Adjusted R-square indicates that 13% of the total variations in overloading of vehicles around its mean is explained by variations in the illegal collection's variables in the model, while the other 87% may be due to variation in extraneous variables. Therefore, this value of the $\text{Adj. } R^2$ indicates that the model has some explanatory ability.

To examine the predictive effect of the predictor variable under the study on the criterion variable, the t-statistics, which test the null hypothesis that the coefficients for the predictor or independent variable were observed, and was found to be statistically significant at the .05 level. Apparently, illegal collection by FRSC personnel (IC., $t=3.890$, $p=.000<0.05$) contributed significantly in predicting the overloading of vehicles by public drivers. the beta coefficients ($\beta=.367$) indicated a positive predictive effect of Illegal Collections by FRSC Personnel on overloading of vehicles among public drivers. Beta values indicated that one unit of increase in the illegal collections by FRSC personnel increases about .367 units of overloading of vehicles.

Sequel to this result, the null hypothesis was

discarded while the alternative hypothesis was retained. This means that there are significant predictive effects of illegal collections by FRSC personnel on the overloading of vehicles among public drivers along Atimbo-Akpabuyo road, Cross River State, Nigeria. This result implies that the greater the rate of illegal collections by FRSC personnel, the greater the overloading of vehicles practices among public driver along Atimbo-Akpabuyo road, Cross River State, Nigeria, and vice versa.

5. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

From the test result of hypothesis 1, it was found that rate of illegal collections by FRSC personnel from public drivers along Atimbo-Akpabuyo road is statistically significant. Implying that the deviant behavior is not strange but rather 'normal' in the area. This could be so for several reasons which could range from systemic corruption among Nigerians, the fear of attack from public transporters who will hardly meet up with demands of the law, high rate of poverty among personnel, general growing economic hardship in Nigeria, political considerations in among others. The finding aligns Arrive Alive (2015) who found in South Africa that corruption was most evident in encounters with traffic officers; and Amnesty International (2014) who contended that the police in Lagos state extort money and use police powers to brutalize

commercial drivers within the city.

The test result from hypothesis 2 indicate that the observed rate of non-regular renewal of vehicle particulars by public drivers in the study area is statistically significant. Suggesting that rather than non-regular renewal being a strange observation, it is now more like a prevalent pattern of behavior among the public drivers who ply Atimbo- Akpabuyo road. The reason for this could be that non regular renewal saves the drivers time and money and maybe that enforcement is not strict. This finding agrees to Omape (2023)'s where it was incontrovertibly stated that commercial drivers in Lagos State do not renew their vehicle documents after the first registration even till their buses get old

The test result from hypothesis 3 on table 3 above indicates that rate of overloading of vehicles particulars by public drivers in the study area is statistically significant. Implying that overloading of vehicle has become more like a normative practice among an appreciable number of public drivers who ply the study area. A simple observation in the study area reveals vehicles carrying excess loads with open booths thereby obstructing the rare mirror or carryings excess loads on top of the vehicles and in most cases 2-3 passengers in front against 1 thereby disabling the proper use of seatbelt and creating inconveniences for the driver. Vehicles are apparently overloaded with humans and goods to make extra income and its prevalence may suggest an absence of strict traffic law enforcement. This finding underscores the work of Sunday & Alade, (2022) and Sieber (2012) who identified overloading as one of the regular traffic violations noticed among public drivers in Nigeria and India respectively.

The test result from hypothesis 4 on table 4 above indicates that illegal collections by FRSC personnel has a significant predictive effect on non-regular renewal of vehicle particulars by public drivers. This might be so because he that must go to equity must go with clean hands. But when there is a compromise from the law enforcer, non-compliance on the part of the public might also be overlooked. This finding underscores the work of Opara (2025) which avowed that the FRSC officials in Nigeria charge ₦500 to ₦1000 at every checkpoint to wave checking commercial vehicles (Opara, 2025).

The finding also indicated that the more prevalent illegal collections from public drivers by FRSC officials, the more rampant non-regular renewal of vehicle particulars will be among public drivers. This may be because, illegal collections reduce the financial possibilities of the public drivers to meet up with the pecuniary requirements of regular

particular renewal. One can only imagine what a driver will have left after making so much unofficial payments on the road, feeding and maintaining the vehicle and taking care of dependents in Nigerian context. This agrees with Sieber (2012) that unofficial charges on the road took over 25% of drivers' earnings and has forced some to fold up.

The test result from hypothesis 5 the last on table 5 above indicates that illegal collections by FRSC personnel has a significant predictive effect on overloading of vehicles among public drivers. This implies that collections of illegal monies, gifts and services by FRSC officials from public drivers weakens their possibilities of enforcing the traffic rules of proper loading in compliance with safety. This could be because, the public transporters will have to overload to make up for the illegal monies, free rides and other gifts some FRSC officials will be given along their journey. This finding is consistent with the view of Farooq *et al* (2021) who noted that commercial drivers deviate from traffic rules to make more money. The finding also indicated that the more prevalent illegal collections from public drivers by FRSC officials, the more rampant the offence of overloading of vehicles will be probably because the attention of the traffic police officials will have shifted from securing the life of road users to securing their illegal income giving room for more violation with impunity. In some cases, just as the 'denial of victim' proposition of the Technique of Neutralization Theory of crime suggests, the officials may even prefer drivers overloading their vehicles to justify their illegal collections.

On the whole, both the finding from the fourth and the fifth hypotheses are consistent with Abbas and Usman (2023)'s studies which indicated an inverse significant relationship between police corruption and the public's compliance with traffic laws.

6. CONCLUSION

Illegal collections by FRSC personnel, non-regular renewal of vehicle documents and overloading of vehicles by public drivers are unfortunate realities along Atimbo-Akpabuyo. These behaviors pose obvious dangers to road safety. To allow it not only to perpetuate but to exacerbate without any workable interceptive technique might signal irresponsibility on the part of stakeholders and hopelessness for the citizens. Illegal collections a form of traffic policing deviance exhibited by FRSC officials engenders non-regular renewal of vehicle particulars and overloading of vehicles by public transporters. Thus stamping out illegal collections

by FRSC officials may help reduce the gravity of the problem of non-regular renewal of vehicle particulars and overloading of vehicles among other noncompliant behavior exhibited by public drivers.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The government should work with independent secrete agencies to monitor the behavior of FRSC officials on the roads and report same for public prosecution of deviants and public reward of conformists.
2. FRSC officials should partner with motor park

regulatory agencies to ensure that overloading is stopped right from the motor parks

3. FRSC officials should partner with motor park regulatory agencies to ensure that drivers who do not possess up to date vehicle particulars are not allowed to load from their parks.
4. Passengers who constitute excess passengers or whose luggage constitute excess loads in public vehicles should be fined officially. This is consistent with the legal maxim- *Qui facit per alium facit per se* ("He who acts through another acts through himself")

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